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Abstract:
The paper evaluates the relative role of institutions and policy structure for a larger 
sample of developed and developing countries in determining economic growth. The 
paper finds that regulation and government effectiveness in formulating fiscal and 
monetary policy is closely related with economic growth more than the efficacy of rule of 
law. Unlike Rodrik et al (2004), social institutions that invest in human capabilities also 
matter equally if not more than independent judiciary. Globalization also works to the 
benefit of domestic polity and economy in income generation.
1 Introduction
Generally the market failure outcomes from 1960s to 1980s had promoted the idea of 
direct government involvement in productive activities in developing countries by 
promoting industrialization through import substitution, investing in industry and 
agriculture, and by providing direct ownership of enterprises. However, this did not work 
well in most developing countries and success stories emerging from developed countries 
that have followed trade liberalization, encouraged many countries in Asia and Latin 
America to narrow down the role of state regulation and embraced free market paradigm 
especially in early 1990s. China, Malaysia, Costa Rica and India are the success stories 
that emerged in developing country landscape that benefited from market liberalization. 
These countries saw an unprecedented rise in productivity and thus higher growth rates 
that were sustained for longer time periods. The success of market liberalization on 
account of economic development motivated developing countries to follow suit and 
most of the South restricted the role of government in controlling market outcomes and 
constituted and promoted state regulatory institutions that acted as facilitators to 
increased private sector activity in productive sectors like services and industry or 
nonproductive sectors like agriculture. (see e.g. World Bank, 1995)
With regard to international trade and its impact on economic well-being, it has to be 
borne in mind that trade can increase or decrease independent of any changes to the 
trade policy stance (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, export subsidies etc.).1 Globalisation, 
factors that are external to an individual nation, may facilitate trade. Technological 
changes may make certain goods, say imports, cheaper despite the presence of trade 
restrictions. Similarly, a fall in transportation costs or the end of war may alter the relative 
price of tradables encouraging more international trade. Trade may increase income, but 
1 By trade policy we mean governmentally induced mechanisms that restrict, relax or facilitate the 
international exchange of certain or all goods and services. 
1changes in trade policies may not foster more international trade and hence not 
contribute to growth or poverty reduction. In short, we have to distinguish between 
openness, some thing that is an outcome of policy choices or serendipity; and trade 
policies aimed at promoting greater international trade which might or might not succeed. 
We make this important distinction in the empirical work that follows, unlike most 
authors including Rodrik et. al (2004). 
Furthermore, Rodrik et al (2004) suggests that independent judiciary that can implement 
rule of law in a country is the most important factor in determining economic growth. 
However, this may be true but institutions have many connotations. In addition to legal 
institutions, economic and social institutions are no less important. Glaeser et al (2004) 
thinks that it is human capital that is the driving force of prosperity for nations. His 
result is substantiated by Mamoon and Murshed (2017). Here in this paper the author 
likes to further contribute to the debate on role of institutions in determining economic 
prosperity by analysing the relative role of legal, social, economic institutions on 
economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 (data and methodology) and 3 
(regression analysis) contain our contribution to the debate. Our analysis, although 
similar to Rodrik et. al (2004), goes beyond their work by including more institutional 
measures, openness indicators, as well as explicit trade policy variables and a role for 
human capital. Therein lies the innovation of our paper. Finally, section 4 concludes with 
some policy implications. 
2. Data and Methodology 
In the light of the above debate our model includes many of the core determinants of 
growth, namely international economic integration (including measures of openness and 
trade policy), measures of institutional quality, physical and human capital.  In fact, our 
dependent variable is not growth per se, but the log of income per-capita, as in Easterly 
and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004).  Differences in per-capita income across 
countries are, of course, often a result of differential growth rates in the past. Here we 
follow the practice in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004) where the 
relative contribution of policies and institutions in explaining per-capita income 
differentials is tested. Our sample includes both rich OECD countries and developing 
countries.  As regards “policy”, we examine the effect of both openness, as in Rodrik et 
al (2004), as well as trade policy variables. Openness indicators are an outcome variable, 
pointing to the extent to which a country trades as a proportion of national income. 
Trade policy indicators are, however, a more direct measure of the policy stance, and this 
was not examined in Rodrik et al. (2004). We deem these policy variables to be of greater 
significance in a test of the relative efficacy of policy vis-à-vis institutions.  
The final equation to be estimated takes the following form: 
………………. (2.1)iiiiii PKHKTPNy  log
The variable is income per capita in country i, , , , and are respectively iy iN iTP iHK iPK
measures for institutions, integration, human capital and physical capital and  is the i
random error term. Human Capital is represented by average schooling years. In order to 
have an in-depth insight into how institutions or increased integration impact on income 
per-capita, we will employ several concepts of institutional quality, trade policy and 
2openness variables following various definitions prevalent in the literature. For 
example, we take into account the six different classifications of institutions identified by 
Kaufman et al (2002), namely rule of law (Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory quality 
(Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and accountability (Va) and control of 
corruption (Ctc). The Kaufman et al (2002) formulated aggregate governance indicators 
covering 175 countries.  They relied on 194 different measures of governance drawn 
from 17 different sources of subjective governance data constructed by 15 different 
sources including international organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, 
think tanks and non governmental organizations. The governance indicators have been 
oriented so that higher values correspond to better outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 
2.5.Rodrik et al (2004) only consider the rule of law. On the international economic 
integration front, we have carefully chosen three specific measures of openness. The 
ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is the conventional openness 
indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar 
and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004). Two other measures of openness are overall trade 
penetration (tarshov) derived from World Bank’s TARS system and overall import 
penetration (Impnov) respectively (see Rose, 2002). Neither of these measures are direct 
indicators of trade policy of a country, pointing only towards the level of its participation 
in international trade. There are indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as measures of 
trade policy (Edwards, 1998; Greenaway et al, 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as 
percentage of imports (Tariffs), tariffs on intermediate inputs and capital goods (Owti), 
trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) and total import charges (Totimpov) can all be 
considered as good proxies for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our 
study. Other measures which capture restrictions in overall trade are non-tariff barriers. 
We use overall non-tariff coverage (Ntarfov) and non-tariff barriers on intermediate 
inputs and capital goods (Owqi) as two proxies for non-tariff barriers (see Rose, 2002). 
Moreover there is also a trend in the trade literature to use composite measures of trade 
policy. Edwards (1998) advocates the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (Open80), 
and Leamer’s openness indicator (Leamer 82) as being apposite proxies of openness. We 
have also used these composite measures to examine in detail how openness influences 
per-capita income. In summary our study employs 6 institutional and 11 openness 
variables in an attempt to undertake a comprehensive analysis of how institutional quality 
and exposure to increased international trade affects the economic performance of a 
country. Unlike in the comparable study by Rodrik et al (2004) we have (a) included a 
role for human capital, (b) employed six institutional variables compared to one only in 
Rodrik et al (rule of law), (c) included trade policy variables and not just openness 
indicators and (d) expanded the set of openness measures employed. 
3Table 2.1: Pair wise Correlation
Regressors   LnY
Lcopen
Impnov
Tarshov
Tariffs 
Owti
Txtrdg
Totimpov
Owqi
Ntarfov
Open80
Leamer82
Va
Ps
Ge
Rq
Rl
Ctc
Pk
Hk
 
0.19
 0.31
 0.37***
-0.51*
-0.41*
-0.59*
-0.11
-0.17
-0.501*
 0.49*
 0.68*
 0.69*
 0.72*
 0.74*
 0.63*
 0.78*
 0.75*
 0.18
 0.88*
                                                 - *, **, *** Bonferroni- Adjusted significance at 1%, 5% and
                                                    10% level, respectively.
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GRAPH 2.1A : Correlations between Income 
and Openness/ Trade Policy Variables:
GRAPH 2.2A: Correlations between Income and Institutional Variables:
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Control for Corruption
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Before we undertake the regression analysis it is 
useful to explore the linear dynamics of the relationship between income and our 
selected determinants of economic prosperity or growth. Table 2.1 provides pair wise 
correlations. The three openness measures show a weak relationship with income. This is 
expected because openness measures capture overall trade in a country. This makes them 
weak proxies for trade policy as differences in trade shares across countries can have 
many exogenous reasons along with income itself, such as geography and trade policies.
On the other hand, the coefficients of our core trade policy variables show that a 
significant linear relationship is present between income and trade restrictiveness. The 
table suggests that any decrease in tariffs and non-tariff barriers has a positive impact on 
per-capita income. Furthermore, institutions and human capital come out to be key 
determinants of economic wellbeing as nearly all of them are significantly related to 
income, see graphs 2.1A and 2.2A.
                          
As indicated earlier, there are potential endogeneity problems between per-capita income 
and institutions, per-capita income and human capital, as well as between openness (or 
the trade policy stance) and income per-capita. One way of cleansing our empirical 
analysis from endogeneity in explanatory variables and the reverse causality between 
dependent and independent variables is to adopt Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques 
in the context of two stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS).  As a first step to run 
IV regressions we have to find appropriate instruments for  our 11 openness/ trade 
policy variables and 6 institutional concepts. The first stage estimation includes 
instruments for the two explanatory variables with potential endogeneity problems. The 
regression estimate in the next stage utilises the predicted variables of these variables for 
institutions and trade policy/openness in a standard per-capita income or growth 
regression as in (1). 
The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade shares following Frankel and Romer 
(FR) (1999) from a gravity equation is the most appropriate instrument for 
openness/trade policy. On the other hand, the most compelling institutional instrument 
is the measure of settler mortality suggested by Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001). But the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al (2004) have 
extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when compared to 
another widely used institutional instrument namely ‘fractions of the population speaking 
English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first language (Eurfrac)’ which 
covers as many as 140 countries. Thus following Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Hall and 
6Jones (1999), we use this instrument for our institutional proxies. We have employed 
total public spending on education (as a percentage of GDP) and primary public-teacher 
ratio as two instruments for human capital, which is proxied by average years of 
schooling at age 25. The former instrument captures the quality of education and the 
later instrument captures the quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ 
‘distance from the equator’ as a fifth instrument (proxy for geography). This is a purely 
exogenous concept.
Our IV regression model has three equations, where in the first stage we generate 
predicted values of institutions, openness/ trade policy and human capital respectively by 
regressing them on a set of instruments. 
……..(2.2)Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGN   1111111
……(2.3)Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGTP   2222222
……(2.4)Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGHK   3333333
where  and are our instruments for institutions referring to fractions of iENG iEUR
population speaking English and European languages respectively. is instrument for iFR
trade policy. TlEX is total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP and 
PTR is primary public-teacher ratio and both are instruments for human capital.  is iGEO
proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second stage the 
predicted values of respective institutional and openness variables are employed in the 
per-capita income equation (2.1) along with concepts of human capital and physical 
capital. 
3. Regression Results
It would be interesting to know what information our first stage results give us regarding 
the quality of instruments. Table 2.2 suggests that for nearly all specifications of 
openness and institutional quality, the respective instruments carry the right signs. In 
some cases when the instruments carry the wrong signs, they are also insignificant. The 
(FR) instrument is statistically significant for all openness variables and 2 out of 6 trade 
policy variables. Though (FR) is not significant for most trade policy variables, there is a 
strong one to one correlation between trade policy and (FR) instrument because the 
former variable always enters the trade policy equation with a right sign.  Similarly ENG 
and EUR come out as sound instruments for institutions as they have generally been 
significant and always with a right sign. Similarly TLEX and PTR establish themselves as 
good instruments for human capital.  However, note that for trade taxes (Txtrg) and non 
tariff barriers (Ntarfov), the signs for public spending on education (TLEX) are positive 
and they are highly significant. This suggests that in an effort to integrate more with the 
world economy, if governments decrease their trade restrictiveness, their development 
7expenditure would bear the brunt of cuts and they may be compromising their goals 
in the education sector by investing less on education.   
Before proceeding to our second stage regressions, we tried to see how predicted values 
of our openness and institutional variables relate to per-capita income in a linear 
framework. To this effect, graphs 2.3B and 2.4B provide graphical representations of 
such linear relationships. It is interesting to note that the use of instrumental variables 
provides a much clearer picture of openness/ trade policy and institutions with regard to 
income when compared to results in graphs 2.1A and 2.2A, especially for the ones which 
depict trade restrictiveness and institutions. This re-establishes the robustness of our 
instruments for openness/ trade policy and institutions. 
Table 2.2:
 First Stage Regression Results for Instrumental variables:
First Stage Results
lcopen Impnov Tarshov Tariff Owti Txtrg Totimpov Owqi Ntarfov
Lfrkrom 0.524 14.71 21.25 -0.86 -0.152 0.008 -22.8 -0.076 -16.40
(9.32)* (8.33)* (6.07)* (-0.53) (-3.33)* (1.52) (-3.3)* (-1.25) (-1.56)
Engfrac 0.421 12.34 21.98 -3.73 0.03 0.017 30.6 -0.157 11.68
(2.31)** (2.37)** (2.13)** (-0.72) (0.32) (1.33) (1.53) (-1.02) 0.38
Eurfrac -0.115 -3.51 -1.29 -2.40 -0.07 -0.006 -13.66 0.09 -0.07
(-0.91) (-0.88) (-0.16) (-0.67) (-0.88) (-0.59) (-1.16) (0.85) (-0.04)
Tlex 0.08 2.44 4.77 0.201 0.007 0.012 -1.94 0.03 7.84
(3.35)* (2.34)** (2.31)** (0.24) (0.35) (5.10)* (-0.67) (1.23) (1.78)***
Ptr 0.001 0.02 0.11 0.083 0.0004 0.001 -0.19 0.003 1.45
(0.43) (0.20) (0.42) (0.72) (0.15) (3.94)* (-0.49) (0.94) (2.42)**
Disteq -0.004 -0.043 -0.105 -0.216 -0.0026 -0.0008 0.08 -0.001 -0.44
(-0.30) (-0.46) (-0.57) (-2.40)** (-1.32) (-3.05)* (0.24) (-0.67) (-0.80)
N 81 53 53 60 49 34 38 49 38
F 23.1* 19.05 11.71* 3.28* 2.68* 12.5* 2.30* 0.87 1.96
R2 0.65 0.71 0.60 0.27 0.27 0.73 0.30 0.11 0.27
First Stage Results
Open80s Leamer82 Va Ps Ge Rq Rl Ctc Hk
Lfrkrom 0.124 -0.0349 0.067 0.052 0.102 0.013 0.08 0.134 -0.25
(0.97) (-0.31) (0.62) (0.46) (1.07) (0.14) (0.85) (1.32) (-0.81)
Engfrac -0.03 0.211 0.75 0.252 0.469 0.175 0.42 0.569 1.28
(-0.12) (0.81) (2.04)** (0.68) (1.49) (0.56) (1.29) (1.69)*** (1.43)
Eurfrac -0.02 -0.303 0.495 0.296 0.47 0.54 0.247 0.353 0.728
(-0.09) (-1.52) (2.03)** (1.21) (2.26)** (2.67)** (1.15) (1.59) (1.10)
Tlex -0.018 -0.067 0.0048 0.037 0.029 0.03 0.079 0.092 0.182
(-0.35) (-1.02) (0.10) (0.78) (0.71) (0.97) (1.92)** (2.15)** (1.26)
Ptr -0.009 -0.030 -0.0063 -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012 -0.005 -0.097
(-1.32) (-3.61)* (-0.84) (-1.7)*** (-1.03) (-0.92) (-1.8)*** (-0.85) (-4.58)*
Disteq 0.005 0.006 0.026 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.025 0.0281 0.049
(1.21) (1.42) (4.43)* (3.68)* (4.79)* (1.96)** (4.70)* (5.03)* (2.95)*
N 35 30 79 73 73 78 78 75 58
F 1.88 5.5* 13.1 10.76* 15.6* 6.95* 18.5* 18.23* 20.63*
R2 0.28 0.58 0.52 0.49 0.57 0.37 0.61 0.61 0.70
- t- Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
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GRAPH 2.3B : Correlations between Income and Predicted Openness/ Trade Policy Variables:
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GRAPH 2.4B : Correlations between 
Income and Predicted Institutional 
Variables:
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Table 2.3.  Second Stage Regression Results for Per Capita Income under Multiple Specifications
Independent 
Variables
Specification Significant Right Sign Significant and  Right Sign
Openness
Lcopen 1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
3 2 out of 6 1 out of 6 1 out of 2
Impnov 1 0 out of 6 1 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
3 3 out of 6 1 out of 6 0 out of 3
Tarshov 1 0 out of 6 1 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 1 out of 6 None
3 2 out of 6 1 out of 6 0 out of 2
Open80s 1 0 out of 6 6 out of 6 none
2 0 out of 6 6 out of 6 none
3 1 out of 6 5 out of 6 1 out of 1
Leamer80s 1 0 out of 6 6 out of 6 none
2 1 out of 6 6 out of 6 1 out of 1
3 1 out of 6 2 out of 6 1 out of 1
Trade Polciy
Tariffs 1 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 5 out of 6 None
3 0 out of 6 6 out of 6 None
Owti 1 0 out of 6 2 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 1 out of 6 None
3 0 out of 6 3 out of 6 None
Txtrdg 1 4 out of 6 6 out of 6 4 out of 4
2 2 out of 6 6 out of 6 2 out of 2
3 2 out of 6 5 out of 6 2 out of 2
Totimpov 1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
3 2 out of 6 0 out of 6 0 out of 2
Owqi 1 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 0 out of 6 None
3 0 out of 6 2 out of 6 None
Ntarov 1 0 out of 6 3 out of 6 None
2 0 out of 6 4 out of 6 None
3 1 out of 6 4 out of 6 1 out of 1
Institutions
Va 1 1 out of 11 5 out of 11 1 out of 1
2 1 out of 11 7 out of 11 1 out of 1
3 9 out of 11 10 out of 11 9 out of 9
Ps 1 0 out of 11 8 out of 11 None
2 0 out of 11 8 out of 11 None
3 10 out of 11 11 out of 11 10 out of 10
Ge 1 0 out of 11 10 out of 11 None
2 0 out of 11 11 out of 11 None
3 10 out of 11 11 out of 11 10 out of 10
Rq 1 0 out of 11 6 out of 11 None
2 0 out of 11 6 out of 11 None
3 9 out of 11 11 out of 11 9 out of 9
Rl 1 0 out of 11 8 out of 11 None
2 0 out of 11 8 out of 11 None
3 9 out of 11 11 out of 11 9 out of 9
Ctc 1 0 out of 11 5 out of 11 None
2 0 out of 11 4 out of 11 None
3 9 out of 11 10 out of 11 9 out of 9
Hk 1 60 out of 66 66 out of 66 60 out of 60
2 60 out of 66 66 out of 66 60 out of 60
Pk 1 0 out of 66 49 out of 66 None
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see 
Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
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- The table illustrates the results for equation 1 under various general specifications. i.e., specification 1: openness or trade 
policy + Institutions + Hk +Pk,  Specification 2: openness or trade policy + Institutions + Hk,                               Specification 
3: openness or trade policy + Institutions.
- Note that specification 3 corresponds to the one adopted by Rodrik et al (2004) for their growth equation.
Moving on to the second stage regression analysis, Table 2.3 provides the results for per-
capita income equation with combinations of our 11 openness/trade policy variables 
with all various institutional concepts under multiple specifications. We employ three 
estimation specifications for our right-hand side variables (see appendix  for data 
definitions and details). In specification 1 we combine openness or trade policy indicators 
with institutions as well as human and physical capital; specification 2 contains openness 
or trade policy indicators along with institutions and human capital but not physical 
capital; and specification 3 is the Rodrik et al. model with trade policy openness 
indicators juxtaposed against institutions only. We argue that specification 1 is a richer 
model, as it contains roles for human and physical capital in explaining per-capita income 
differences across nations.    
Only for specification 3, which corresponds to the specification followed by Rodrik et al 
(2004), the results turn out to be similar to their study. Institutions clearly trump 
openness and trade policy as they have been highly significant in most cases. In contrast 
to institutional proxies, openness variables generally remained insignificant, and if 
significant have mostly entered equation 1 with a wrong sign. Trade policy variables also 
remained insignificant under specification 3 with the exception of trade taxes which are 
significant in some cases. 
However, for specifications 1 and 2, where human capital enters equation 1, the results 
present a different picture and challenge the position taken up by Rodrik et al (2004) 
apropos the inconsequential role of trade in economic development in the face of 
stronger institutions. For specification 1 and 2 institutions are overwhelmingly 
insignificant. Compared to specification 3, the frequency of insignificance for openness 
reaches nearly 100 percent in specifications 1 and 2 when human capital is considered. 
Openness proxies are insignificant, as well as having the wrong signs in most cases. The 
insignificance of openness proxies capturing the level of trade or movements in terms of 
trade is not surprising. These results are in accordance with the findings of Dollar and 
Kraay (2002) and Rodrik (1998), who suggest that the correlation of trade levels and 
growth performance is at best weak in the long run. Our results reinforce this fact in a 
more comprehensive manner, as we have provided additional specifications to the per-
capita income equation by including human capital and physical capital. Especially, the 
inclusion of human capital has improved the explanatory power of our model, as is 
evident from higher values.2R
As far as the trade policy variables are concerned, they are significant in some cases and 
the frequency of significance is much higher when compared to openness variables. 
Though trade policy indicators too can have wrong signs,2 unlike Rodrik et al (2004) and 
our own analysis, where in many instances openness variables carry wrong signs and have 
also been significant, our trade policy variables which carry incorrect signs are generally 
insignificant. With the exception of Totimpov, other trade policy variables always enter 
equation 1 with right signs whenever they are significant. Tariffs, Owti, Owqi and Ntarov 
also show wrong signs but in such instances they have also been insignificant. In fact, 
2 This occurs when import protection increases per-capita income. 
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Owqi which has highest frequency of wrong signs next to Totimpov, remains insignificant 
under all specifications and with any of the institutional combinations. By contrast, Txtrg 
which is the most significant trade policy variable, always enter the equation with a right 
(negative) sign showing that trade policy does matter and trade restrictiveness indeed 
lowers per-capita income or growth.
It is also important to understand why some trade policy variables have the wrong signs 
or are insignificant, when others have passed the test by emerging as significant 
contributors to economic success. With regard to the insignificance of import taxes 
Totimpov, one can suggest that their contribution depends upon the composition of goods 
imported. For example, for a developing country the availability of technologically 
superior import goods has positive effects on output and growth, but if imports are 
dominated by consumption goods, a reduction in import taxes may very well hamper 
growth potentials, and at a cost to the public exchequer.  Rodrik (1998) supports this line 
of argument, as he found that changes in import taxes fail to influence growth in Sub 
Saharan African countries.  According to him it is export taxes, which if lowered, 
contribute to growth. Esfhani (1991), however, provides contrary evidence. Similarly Lee 
(1995) found that there is a significant impact of imports on growth suggesting import 
taxes do matter in affecting growth. Thus in the context of a cross sectional study, it is 
wiser to examine the impact of overall trade taxes (import and export) instead of looking 
at any one of them in order to have a general insight into the workings of trade taxes 
apropos economic activity. According to Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), overall trade 
taxes capture trade restrictiveness in a more complete manner than any of the other 
proxies of trade policy as it is comprised of both import and export taxes. 
Not surprisingly, Txtrg (overall trade taxes) comes out to be the most important trade 
policy variable since it has been recorded as significant in many instances in all the 3 
specifications(see table 2.4). To be exact, Txtrdg is significant in 4 out of 6 cases in 
specification 1, 2 out of 6 cases in specification 2 and 2 out of 6 cases in specification 3. 
Note that trade taxes are most significant in specification 1, where human and physical 
capital enters the per capita equation. In comparison, the institutional proxies always 
enter equation 1 as insignificant under the same specification. This is again an important 
result if we compare it with the results obtained by Rodrik et al (2004), where it was 
openness which was generally insignificant and institutions (Rule of Law) have largely 
been highly significant at 1% level of significance. All in all, trade taxes enter significantly 
in the per-capita equation with voice and accountability, political stability, regulatory 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption making a strong case for the important role 
trade policy plays in economic development. 
 Table 2.4: Second Stage Regression Results for Txtrdg and Institutions
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income
Independent
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Txtrdg -16.86 -9.61 1.33 -15.11 -9.38 -17.8 -14.68 -8.38 -8.21 -17.61 -9.28 -10.91 -14.72 -9.42 -18.41 -15.56 -9.05 -19.62
(1.7)*** (-1.7)*** (0.1) (2.0)** (-1..9)*** (-1.61) (-1.24) (-1.63) (-0.7) (-1.57) (-1.7)*** (-0.74) (-1.9)*** (-2.1)** (-1.9)*** (1.8)*** (-1.53) (2.0)**
Va -0.3508 -0.148 1.25
(-0.44) (-0.21) (3.7)*
Ps 0.142 0.0528 0.97
(0.34) (0.09) (3.24)*
Ge 0.122 0.355 1.04
(0.12) (0.45) (3.9)*
Rq -0.299 0.058 1.87
(-0.29) (0.08) (2.85)*
Rl 0.205 0.250 0.85
(0.35) (0.37) (3.61)*
Ctc -0.194 -0.108 0.76
(-0.25) (-0.16) (3.6)*
Hk 0.4752 0.461 0.313 0.392 0.323 0.286 0.413 0.399 0.283 0.306 0.446 0.46
(1.7)*** (1.9)*** (2.0)*** (1.72)*** (0.97) (1.01) (2.05)** (2.42)** (1.23) (1.08) (1.26) (1.43)
Pk 0.039 0.039 0.032 0.041 0.030 0.038
(1.12) (1.13) (0.78) (1.07) (0.97) (1.12)
N 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32 31 32
F 17.8* 29.6* 42.5* 26.9* 35.6* 27.9* 25.4* 46.0* 41.4* 18.2* 34.2* 41.4* 29.1* 45.4* 43.9* 19.4* 30.4* 42.5*
R 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.79 0.77 0.51 0.78 0.82 0.67 0.69 0.76 0.67 0.80 0.82 0.67 0.71 0.73 0.66
- t- Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively.
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993).
- Please also refer to table 5, where we give results for equation 5. Txtrdg is the most significant variable out of the three openness and trade policy variables (i.e., Lcopen,   tariffs and Txtrdg) 
we have employed, respectively.  
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We have also included more specific proxies of trade restrictiveness (tariffs and non-tariff barriers) 
in an attempt to identify the optimal trade policy tools for policy makers. In Table 2.3 Owti (tariffs 
on intermediate inputs and capital goods) and Owqi (non-tariff barriers on intermediate inputs and 
capital goods) have been insignificant under all specifications of our per-capita income equation and 
with any of the institutional combinations. Though we find Ntarfov (overall non-tariff barriers) 
significant for specification 3 when it enters the equation with rule of law, it does not say much 
about the role of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), as Ntarfov remains insignificant for the other five 
institutional proxies under the same specification.. The insignificance of TB and NTBs does come as 
a surprise. Dollar and Kraay (2002) share this skepticism over the relevance of these measures of 
trade policy with the likes of Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) and Frankel and Romer (1999). Perhaps 
this is the reason why trade policy variables are virtually absent in the recent empirical debate over 
trade and institutions. For example, Frankel and Romer (1999), Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001), Alcala and Ciccone (2002), Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik et al (2004) all have tried to 
find partial effects of trade and institutions on per-capita income or its growth by taking into 
account the general openness indicator (trade over GDP ratio) only. 
There are many studies which have tried to capture the effects of trade policy on economic 
development: Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998) and Greenaway, Morgan and Wright (2002) 
are among the prominent studies which have employed direct proxies of trade policies. They 
confirm that the countries with policy-induced barriers to international trade grow at a slower pace. 
Notwithstanding the important role of these studies in providing useful insights into the ‘trade and 
growth’ debate, they have two shortcomings. First, in the light of recent evidence provided by 
Rodrik et al (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002), their studies are likely to suffer from 
misspecification bias as they have not taken account of institutions in their growth equations. 
Secondly, they have assumed trade policy to be purely exogenous. 
Wood (2004), commenting on the ‘trade and growth’ debate, not only emphasised that a more 
convincing basis for trade policy recommendations could only be provided if trade policy variables 
are included in the regressions, but also pointed out that any such attempt should consider trade 
policy as an endogenous concept as no trade policy recommendations can be given without taking 
second best effects into account. This is because trade policies crucially depend on the functioning 
of domestic markets of any particular country, and if these are imperfect, second best considerations 
enter the picture.
To this effect we have somewhat addressed the endogeneity of trade policy variables by regressing 
them on a set of instruments. Though the instruments remain very general in nature they do capture 
certain country specific characteristics. And as our per-capita income equation has institutional 
proxies and human capital along with trade policy variables, our analysis goes a step further from 
previous cross sectional studies which have attempted to gauge the effects of trade policy on 
economic development.
  
Although some of our trade policy variables are insignificant, we do get certain trade proxies which 
show that trade policy does matter in determining economic prosperity. The importance of any such 
cases is self evident because we not only dealt with trade policy as an endogenous concept but we 
have also included institutions and human capital in our per-capita income determining equation, so 
as to avoid the misspecification bias which cross section studies including the recent ones by Rodrik 
et al (2004) and Dollar and Kraay (2002) suffers from.
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Overall, the results suggest that the general openness variables fail to explain per-capita income 
differences compared to direct proxies of the trade policy stance. For example, lcopen, Impnov and 
Tarshov have been found insignificant in all our specifications, suggesting their weak relationship with 
income. By contrast, our results suggest that decreases in overall trade taxes are associated with 
strong improvements in economic performance. 
We also employ composite measures of openness that are really indices of the trade policy stance, as 
well as measures based on residuals, regressed with the six institutional concepts. Again we find that 
institutions, though significant in many instances, are not the most significant factor in determining 
per-capita income differences. Here too, we find out that trade liberalisation does matter as Open80s 
(the Sachs–Warner openness measures) enters equation 1 with a correct sign in 17 out of 18 cases 
including the ones it is significant for. Similarly Leamer82 (Leamer’s measure of trade restrictiveness 
based on residuals) is significant with regulatory quality under specifications 2 and 3 and generally 
enters equation 1 with a correct sign (see table 2.3). 
Here the significance and correct signs of open80s reinforces the importance of the overall trade 
policy stance, informing us that even if tariffs and non-tariff barriers are unimportant at times, the 
composite trade policy package, especially taxes on exports and controls in the foreign exchange 
market can be crucial in explaining per-capita income differences across nations. The Sachs-Warner 
criteria  defines country as open if (i) non-tariff barriers cover less than 40 percent of trade, (ii) 
average tariff rates are less than 40 percent, (iii) the black market premium was less than 20 percent 
during the 1980s, (iv) the economy is not socialist, and (v) the government does not control major 
exports through marketing boards. The rationale for combining these indicators into a single 
dichotomous variable is that they represent different ways in which policy makers can close their 
economy to international trade. However, according to the evidence provided by Rodriguez and 
Rodrik (2000), the Sachs- Warner composite measure (open80) mainly derives its strength from the 
combination of black market premium and the state monopoly of exports. A state monopoly on 
major exports captures cases in which governments tax major exports and therefore reduce the level 
of trade (exports and imports), and the black market premium captures foreign exchange restrictions 
as a trade barrier. Though Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) accepted state monopoly of exports as an 
appropriate proxy of trade restrictiveness, they felt that black market premia was not a good choice 
as it is highly correlated with inflation, the debt/export ratio, wars and institutional quality and may 
simply capture the effect of widespread macroeconomic and political crisis. Our IV regression 
analysis solves the problem of endogeneity of black market premia as we have regressed open80s 
with set of institutional and openness instruments. It may, therefore, be that both government 
monopoly over major exports and black market premia are robust proxies of trade restrictiveness. 
Now we turn to institutions and their apparent role in economic development. Specification 3 in 
table 2.3, which corresponds to the Rodrik et al (2004) specification, supplements their assertion that 
institutional development is the key to economic development as our six institutional proxies have 
largely been significant when paired with any of the openness and trade policy variables under 
specification 3.  But it would be interesting to know which institutional concepts matter more in 
explaining income differentials across countries? 
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Table 2.5  Institutional comparisons
Voice and 
Accountability
(Va)
Politcal Stability
(Ps)
Government 
Effectiveness
(Ge)
Regulatory 
Quality
(Rq)
Rule of Law
(Rl)
Control for 
Corruption
(Ctc)
Control 
Variables
(Lcopen) 1.037 2.132 1.375 1.546 1.837 1.181
(4.52)*** (2.86)*** (4.04)*** (4.07)*** (2.76)*** (5.03)***
(Impnov85) 1.109 2.242 1.805 1.464 2.35 1.682
(6.64)*** (3.53)*** (4.13)*** (6.44)*** (3.11)*** (3.71)***
(Tarshov85) 1.484 1.543 1.568 2.192 1.412 1.474
(10.93)*** (9.84)*** (10.30)*** (10.73)*** (12.12)*** (9.34)***
(Tariffs) 1.23 1.357 1.354 1.683 0.811 0.885
(1.64)* (2.95)*** (2.19)** (3.28)*** (2.16)** (1.30)
(Owti) 1.456 1.481 1.701 1.928 1.341 1.491
(6.37)*** (7.76)*** (5.94)*** (7.11)*** (8.38)*** (5.93)***
(Txtrdg) 1.110 1.337 1.188 1.62 1.281 0.882
(2.72)*** (3.16)*** (3.53)*** (2.96)*** (2.68)*** (3.29)***
(Totimpov85) 1.113 1.906 2.417 1.542 1.821 2.434
(5.31)*** (3.96)*** (3.88)*** (5.61)*** (4.27)*** (4.72)***
(Owqi) 1.46 1.481 1.701 1.928 1.341 1.490
(6.37)*** (7.76)*** (5.90)*** (7.11)*** (8.38)*** (5.93)***
(Ntarfov87) 0.616 1.861 2.68 0.707 0.936 1.181
(1.78)*** (2.24)** (1.68)* (1.09) (1.73)* (1.93)***
(Open80s) 1.085 1.3904 1.258 1.296 0.095 0.225
(3.89)*** (2.63)*** (3.13)*** (2.92)*** (0.12) (0.33)
(Leamer82) 0.983 1.094 0.951 1.387 0.9036 0.774
(4.97)*** (2.54)*** (2.16)** (3.59)*** (1.79)* (1.75)*
t- values are in the parentheses. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively, Control variables are in first column in paranthesis, Note: The above 
table provides IV regression coefficients of institutions under specification 3 of the per-capita income equation (Eq. 2.1). Note that specification 3, which only employs 
institutions and openness in order to explain income differences, is the one followed by Rodrik et al. (2004).
Table 2.5 shows that regulatory quality is the most important institutional definition in determining 
economic performance as it has one of the highest coefficients in nearly all instances. The 
superiority of regulatory quality is self evident because it captures the policy choices which dictate 
market outcomes. For example, it measures the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as 
protection of imports, control on foreign ownership, obstacles to foreign bidders on public 
contracts, real personal tax as a burden to enterprise, real corporate tax as a disincentive for 
entrepreneurship, the legal framework as an obstacle to competitiveness, customs as an impediment 
to international trade, price controls and competition laws as obstacles to competition. The key to 
development may lie in market friendly regulations through which the workings of financial and 
commercial institutions improve and adequate business development takes place amid increased 
competition. The importance of prudential regulation can be judged from the fact that many 
developing countries have done well, despite being run by autocratic states. China and South Korea 
are the prime examples in this regard.  Glaeser et al (2004a, 2004b) suggest that China, South Korea 
and Taiwan witnessed unprecedented increases in their growth rates under the reign of one-party 
dictatorships all due to the promotion of pro-market, pro growth policies, whereby property rights 
were secured and competition encouraged. 
Regulatory quality is followed by government effectiveness as the most important institutional 
proxy. Again, this is expected because government effectiveness is very close to regulatory quality in 
the sense that the former focuses on inputs required for the government to be able to produce and 
implement robust policies whereas the later captures these policies itself. ‘Government effectiveness’ 
measures the quality of public service provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the independence of the 
civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies. 
In other words, it captures the efficient functioning of the government machinery. 
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The third most important institutional concept is political stability. It actually captures political 
instability arising from conflict via armed conflict, social unrest, politically motivated violence or 
terrorist threats.  Large-scale conflict in the contemporary world mainly takes the form of internal 
wars in developing countries. There have been over forty civil war episodes since the end of the cold 
war. These conflicts are a major cause of development failure, contributing to the persistence of 
poverty.  
Political stability is followed by rule of law and control for corruption. ‘Rule of Law’ measures 
respect for societal rules, confidence in the supremacy of law and captures the public perception of 
the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the 
judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. In short it accounts for the success of a society in 
developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and 
social interactions. On the other hand ‘control for corruption’ measures corruption within the legal, 
financial or economic system, which distorts the competitive environment, and reduces the 
efficiency of government and business by enabling people to abuse positions of power through 
bribes, patronage and nepotism. 
‘Voice and accountability’, corresponding to democracy, is the institutional proxy which matters 
least. It captures various aspects of the political process, civil liberties and political right and 
measures the transparency of political, commercial and legal institutions. The view of Barro (1996) is 
that democracy can positively affect growth when personal and political freedoms are very weak, but 
lowers growth when some liberties are already in place. This suggests a quadratic relationship 
between democracy and growth, it is first positive and then negative. Voice and accountability may 
matter less when government effectiveness, regulatory capacity and the rule of law are well 
established and function well. But democracy may be of greater importance when these other factors 
are weak.   
In contrast to our results for specification 3 apropos institutional superiority over trade, 
specifications 1 and 2 which include human capital, tell a different story which brings us back to the 
work of Rodrik el al (2004). However, they did not take into account human capital in their log of 
per capita income equations and thus their analysis may have misspecification biases as can be seen 
from the very low values they get for their growth equations. Our analysis includes human 2R
capital, which significantly improves the explanatory power of the model as can be seen from highly 
significant F statistic and high in table 4 (Appendix 2). Further more, our study is in line with 2R
recent cross sectional work on institutions and economic growth, which also brings human capital 
into the picture as an equally important determinant of economic development (see Glaeser et al, 
2004a).
In comparison to the findings of Rodrik et al (2004) regarding the pre-eminence of institutions over 
trade, in a better specified model (refer to specifications 1 and 2 in table 3 and 4: Appendix 2), we 
find that institutional superiority vis-à-vis trade policy has diminished. In many instances, institutions 
enter the per-capita equation insignificantly esspecially when human capital is present in equation 1. 
Though institutions always carry right signs if significant, there have been many instances when they 
have entered equation 1 with wrong signs too. For example, in table 3, voice and accountability, 
regulatory quality and control of corruption have the wrong (negative) sign whenever they enter the 
equation with overall non-tariff barriers (Ntarfov). Rule of law is insignificant in any combination 
with the 11 openness or trade policy variables for specifications 1 and 2, as well as enter with a 
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wrong sign in half of the cases. This is an interesting finding in the light of the Rodrik et al (2004) 
paper, which employed the rule of law as the only proxy for institutions and then go on to claim the 
superiority of institutions over openness. Though we also find that institutional superiority is 
somewhat retained in a per-capita income equation which has openness proxies, but with the 
introduction of trade policy variables the superiority of institutions diminishes especially in the case 
of trade taxes and open80s.
One reason for getting insignificant values for institutions in specification 1 and 2 could be because 
human capital influences economic development by improving the working of institutions, as 
suggested by Lipset (1960) and recently re-emphasised in Glaeser et al (2004a and 2004b). Our 
results support this, as we find that human capital is always significant when it enters in equation 1 
under specifications 1 and 2, taking over from institutions in explaining differences in per capita 
income (table 2. 3).  
4. Conclusion:
 
Though there are success stories of trade liberalization among both developed and developing 
countries - the failures on account of job loss to more competitive economies has led to a focus on 
regulatory state (Majone, 1994; 1997). The regulatory state model implies leaving production to 
private sector where competitive markets work well and using government regulation where 
significant market failure exists.(world Bank, 2001;1) For example, Chinese economy has been 
benefitting from strong government regulation and facilitation of private businesses by 
incorporation of property rights that creates strong incentives to local and international firms to 
exploit cheap production costs within Chinese borders and open up, operate and expand their 
businesses locally and globally. 
The performance of new regulatory state remains under researched, especially in the context of 
developing countries with their own peculiar economic and social problems and institutional 
characteristics. (Jalilian et al, 2006) Our results provide some guidelines to this effect. If economic 
growth is the priority of the government and this has been the case for all developing countries, then 
improving regulatory structures within the economy makes it competitive and productive. However 
the back channel loops of social and legal institutions catch up to stifle this progress if not improved 
accordingly. (Mamoon, 2008) In developing countries, the social welfare objectives of regulation are 
likely to be not simply concerned with the pursuit of economic efficiency but with wider goals to 
promote sustainable development and poverty reduction. (Guasch and Hahn, 1999)
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